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Defamation and the Misuse of Private Information: A Comparative Analysis 
This article considers the interrelationship between defamation and misuse of private 
information actions and whether the same set of facts might give rise to parallel 
actions. The starting point for the analysis is that privacy actions are tortious rather 
than equitable which removes a fundamental difference between the two. In 
comparing the two actions, the author analyses whether corporations can rely on 
ECHR Art 8 in privacy cases which has proved controversial. The application of 
ECHR Art 10 to natural and legal persons is however more straightforward in both 
cases. Central to the analysis in this article is how the Art 8 and 10 balance is struck, 
and the role played by public interest in this assessment. The Strasbourg decision in 
Axel Springer is crucial in this regard as it applies the same set of criteria to both 
actions. Once all these issues have been considered, then the availability of 
remedies and defences will be analysed and compared. The author will conclude by 
arguing that both torts protect different aspects of reputation and they should be seen 
as separate but overlapping. Recent developments are however bringing them closer 
together. 
Introduction 
Challenging questions about the interrelationship between actions for defamation and the 
relatively new action for misuse of private information have been raised recently although 
many aspects of that relationship remain unresolved.1 Case law suggests that the precise 
nature of that relationship is largely untested and therefore merits further analysis.2   The 
tensions between the two actions have been heightened by the influence of European Court 
of Human Rights3 and the reaction to it by English judges. Any consideration of the overlap 
between the two actions must start with the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (1950) ETS 5; 213 UNTS 2214 Art 8 which protects both reputation 
and privacy and Art 10 which guarantees freedom of expression. This is because English 
and Strasbourg case law concern reputation and image.  
This article will begin by considering cases on whether the misuse of private information 
action is a tortious or equitable which had proved controversial in the past but it will be 
argued that it is a tort based on recent case law. This is the starting point for the comparison 
between the two actions. Both actions will then be compared once it has been determined 
that it is a tort. We will continue by considering who can sue, which involves analysing 
whether corporations can sue in defamation and whether they can argue misuse of private 
                                                          
The author would like to thank Professor Jason Chuah, Professor Claire de Than and Dr Carmen Draghici for 
their helpful comments on earlier drafts. Any errors or omissions are the author’s.  
 
1 See Eric Barendt, An overlap of defamation and privacy? (2015) 7(1) JML 85; David Rolph, Vindicating 
reputation and privacy in Comparative Defamation and Privacy Law edited by Andrew Kenyon (Cambridge 
University Press, 2016) and Ursula Cheer, Singapore Conference Articles Recognition of business and economic 
interests of media in defamation and privacy law (2016) 23 TLJ 193.  
2John Terry (originally LNS) v Persons Unknown [2010] EWHC 11 (QB), [78] (Tugendhat J) and Lord Sumption in 
Khuja v Times Newspapers Limited [2017] UKSC 49 [21]. See also Nicole Moreham and Mark Warby, Tugendhat 
and Christie the Law of Privacy and the Media (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2016), 351.  
3 Later the Strasbourg Court 
4 Later ECHR. 
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information. This issue is uncontroversial for defamation purposes but remains more difficult 
for the misuse of private information action. The focus will then shift to Art 8 / 10 balance 
which is crucial to the determination in all cases in this field. The penultimate area for 
discussion will be remedies: first, damages, and in particular the availability of exemplary 
damages which is more controversial in privacy cases; and second, interim injunctions 
where the interplay between the two actions is tricky. Lawyers are circumventing the 
restrictive rules on injunctions in defamation cases by arguing them as harassment cases 
instead which has complicated matters. There is “clear water” between the two actions when 
it comes to defences. The author will conclude that it would be best from an English law 
perspective to argue the two actions in the alternative rather than in parallel. 
Is the Action for Misuse of Private Information a Tort? 
Whilst defamation is a tort, the misuse of private information action emerged from breach of 
confidence, an equitable right.5 The latter rests on rather different foundations and protects 
different interests: secret or confidential information as opposed to private information.6 Eady 
J argued that privacy was equitable in Mosley v News Group Newspapers,7 whereas 
Tugendhat J took the opposite view in Vidal-Hall v Google.8 The Court of Appeal in Vidal-
Hall9 decided that it was a tort for the purposes of service out of the jurisdiction. Although an 
appeal to the Supreme Court was allowed in part, this issue did not raise any arguable 
points of law and was not appealed.10 There is therefore strong recent authority for the 
proposition that the misuse of private information action is a tort removing the most obvious 
distinction between the two. We will now continue by looking more closely at both actions. 
The Essence of the Actions for Defamation and for Misuse of Private Information 
Defamation is defined as the publication of material which refers to the claimant and which 
tends to lower him in the estimation of right-thinking people11 and causes or is likely to cause 
him serious harm.12 The emphasis is on false information13 whereas the action for misuse of 
                                                          
5 Most believe that breach of confidence is an equitable cause of action although some argue that it might be 
tortious. For further analysis: see Roger Toulson and Charles Phipps, Confidentiality (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed, 
2012) chapter 2; Tanya Aplin, Gurry on Breach of Confidence (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2012) chapter 4. 
6 As Tugendhat and Christie, above n 2, put it at 150 the action for breach of confidence and the action for 
misuse of private information “coexist”. A detailed consideration of breach of confidence is beyond the scope 
of this article although it is dealt with fully in texts such as Tugendhat and Christie above n 2 and Gurry above n 
5. The interrelationship with the action for misuse of private information will be considered in outline only.  
7 [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB). 
8[2014] EWHC 13 (QB) [50] – [70]. 
9 [2015] EWCA Civ. 311. 
10 Misuse of private information is viewed as a tort in cases such as Campbell v News Group Newspapers 
Limited [2004] UKHL 22 [14] (Lord Nicholls); Douglas v Hello (No. 3) [2003] EWCA Civ. 595 [96] (Lord Philipps 
MR); Gulati v News Group Newspapers Limited [2015] EWCA Civ. 1291 [87] – [89] (Arden LJ). 
11 Sim v Stretch [1936] All ER 1237. 
12 The Defamation Act 2013 (UK), c 26 s.1 and Ambrosiadou v Coward [2011] EWCA Civ. 409 [28] where Lord 
Neuberger MR pointed out that information of a “trivial nature of a low level of personal significance” would 
not engage Art. 8 for privacy purposes. The appeal in Lachaux v Independent Print [2017] EWCA Civ. 1334 (on 
s. 1(1)) is due to be heard by the Supreme Court in November 2018. 
13 Tugendhat and Christie, above n 2, argue that: “Defamation protects a person against humiliation, and from 
discrimination based on false facts in personal and professional relationships. It also protects society from 
making political, professional and personal choices on a factual basis which is false”, 355.    
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private information focusses on true but private information14 and the requirement since 
Campbell15 that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy to engage ECHR Art 8.16  
 
In Douglas v Hello,17 the House of Lords accepted that a new cause of action had been 
created separately from the action for breach of confidence.18 Indeed, Tugendhat and 
Christie suggest that the tort of misuse of private information might be more appropriate than 
the action for breach of confidence where the claimant is trying to protect his private life.19 
Breach of confidence is not redundant in privacy cases where the media is the defendant. 
The Court of Appeal has held that a duty of confidence can arise from a confidential 
relationship which might be important or even decisive in a claim for misuse of private 
information although not relevant to a defamation claim.20 
 
The Strasbourg Court confirmed in Pfeifer v Austria21 that ECHR Art 8 encompasses a  
                                                          
14David Rolph says that defamation turns on the true / false dichotomy and privacy on the public / private 
dichotomy in Irreconcilable Differences? Interlocutory Injunctions for Defamation and Privacy (2012) 17(2) 
MALR 170, 173. However even this distinction is questionable as defamation cases can succeed where the 
material cannot be proved to be true by the defence and there are cases of “false privacy” such as P v Quigley 
[2008] EWHC 1051 (QB). 
15[2004] UKHL 22, [21] (Lord Nicholls). 
16 As Tugendhat and Christie, above n 2, say, 152: since the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) c 42 
(later HRA), courts have had to act consistently with the ECHR pursuant to s.6. They attempted to “absorb” or 
“shoehorn” the values contained in ECHR Articles 8 and 10 within the existing action for breach of confidence, 
see for example: A v B & C plc [2002] EWCA Civ. 337 [4] (Lord Woolf); Douglas v Hello (No. 8) [2005] EWCA Civ. 
595 [53] (Lord Phillips MR). This was unsatisfactory according to Lord Nicholls in Campbell [2004] UKHL 22, 
[14]: “This cause of action has now firmly shaken off the limiting constraint of the need for an initial 
confidential relationship. In so doing it has changed its nature…The continuing use of the phrase “duty of 
confidence” and the description of the information as “confidential” is not altogether comfortable. 
Information about the individual’s private life would not, in ordinary usage, be called “confidential”. The more 
natural description today is that such information is private. The essence of the tort is better encapsulated 
now as misuse of private information.” 
17 [2007] UKHL 21. 
18 [255] (Lord Nicholls); Tugendhat and Christie, above n 2, 152. In Campbell [2004] UKHL 22, Lady Hale said at 
[132] – [134] that no new cause of action had been created. The Court of Appeal took a similar approach until 
Vidal – Hall [2015] EWCA Civ. 311 when it accepted that the misuse of private information action was a 
separate cause of action. Lord McFarlane MR held at [21] that although the action had been absorbed 
originally by the action for breach of confidence which should be distinguished from misuse of private 
information. They protected different interests: secret / confidential information as opposed to private 
information. They are now two distinct causes of action. 
19 171, where they suggest that breach of confidence might be more appropriate in claims of a more 
commercial nature. 
20 McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ. 1714 [15] (Buxton LJ) where he held a duty of confidence would usually 
stem from a transaction between the parties or their pre-existing relationship. In HRH The Prince of Wales v 
Associated Newspapers (No. 3) [2006] EWCA Civ. 1776, the court held that this was not a privacy case but a 
more traditional breach of confidence case, namely a breach of a contractual duty by a former employee. It 
would not be appropriate to consider Campbell [2004] UKHL 22 as the information was confidential as it 
should be in a breach of confidence case. Weight was added by the public interest in observing a duty of 
confidence in HRH The Prince of Wales. The publisher knew that information had been revealed in 
contravention of that duty. In Browne v Associated Newspapers [2007] EWCA Civ. 295 it was held that whether 
the parties had enjoyed a relationship of confidence could be important in assessing whether there was a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  
21[2007] ECHR 935, [35]; Application by The Guardian Newspaper and Media Ltd [2010] UKSC1 (Lord Rodger) 
[42]. 
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person’s right to protect their reputation as part of the right to respect for their private life.22 
Once Art 8 is engaged, then the court should balance ECHR Arts 8 and 10 bearing in mind 
that both carry equal weight.23 The balancing exercise should consider if the requisite 
elements of the tort are made out and whether there has been an infringement. This covers 
both actions.24 
 
The next question goes to the heart of the distinction: whether both actions protect damage 
to reputation. In Hannon v News Group Newspapers,25 Mann J refused to rule out the 
possibility that damage to reputation might form the basis of both actions26. He suggested 
that disclosure of medical records of a: “socially embarrassing but historic sexual medical 
condition affecting a prominent person” might cause not only embarrassment but also harm 
to reputation. Would the main action relate to the consequences of infringing privacy and 
would any damage to reputation be reflected in the award of damages? If so, then it should 
be pleaded as a privacy case.  As Mann J suggested, the choice between the two might 
depend on whether the defence of truth27 would defeat a defamation claim.28 It would be an 
abuse to avoid the defence of truth or the one-year limitation period in defamation cases29 by 
arguing privacy wrongly.30 Mann J also raises the possibility of parallel proceedings31 but the 
issue was not determined conclusively. As we will see later however, the courts might not 
allow a defamation case to be framed as a privacy case either to avoid the stricter rules on 
interim injunctions.32 
 
Whilst defamation protects reputation rather than hurt feelings, privacy protects the right to 
keep certain information private, even this crucial distinction is questionable. The focus in the 
action for misuse of private information is not on protecting reputation against the publication 
of untrue facts as in defamation but on preventing the invasion of privacy by revelations of 
                                                          
22 The Strasbourg Court takes a broad view of the concept of private life – Von Hannover v Germany (No 1) 
[2004] ECHR 294 where it held that photographs taken in both public and semi-public places could be 
protected by the right to privacy even in the absence of harassment. The Court also found that the photos of 
Princess Caroline going about her daily business did not contribute to a debate on a matter of general public 
interest. 
23 White v Sweden [2006] ECHR 793, [19] and [30]; Re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) 
[2004] UKHL 47 [17] (Lord Steyn). 
24 Striking the right balance between ECHR Arts 8 and 10 was one of the aims of the 2013 Act, see also the 
1998 Act ss 2, 6 and 12 which provide that English courts must consider the ECHR and Strasbourg case law.  
25 [2014] EWHC 1580 (Ch) [29]. 
26 Tugendhat and Christie, above n 2, 350, however say that even though the law of privacy might protect 
reputation, this might be either an “incidental benefit (or disbenefit) of the introduction of a privacy law, or as 
an additional justification for a privacy law”. It is in their view a moot point.  
27 The 2013 Act s.2. 
28 Browne [2007] EWCA Civ. 295 [56]; [2007] EWHC 202 (QB) [52] (Eady J). 
29 Limitation Act 1980 (UK), c 58, s.4A. 
30 Hannon [2014] EWHC 1580 (Ch) [26]. 
31 [49]. 
32 Hannon [2014] EWHC 1580 (Ch), [53]. 
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true facts or images of you and / or your family.33 Both actions do cover to some extent 
autonomy, integrity and dignity. 34 
The Strasbourg Court has also held that even though the main purpose of Art 8 is to protect 
individuals from unlawful state interference with those rights, there might also be an 
obligation on the state to uphold the right to private or family life.35 
Both ECHR Arts 8 and 10 are vertically and horizontally effective which is important36 as the 
media are often defendants in these proceedings. Questions do however arise over the 
scope of those articles and whether a corporation might argue a breach of ECHR Art 8 and 
this will be considered next. 
Defamation and ECHR Article 8  
It was clear even before the 2013 Act that corporations could bring defamation proceedings 
to protect their trading reputation and commercial viability.37 Companies must show that the 
defamatory material has caused or is likely to cause serious economic loss.38The law is 
based upon the premise that a company’s reputation is a thing of value. Damage to 
corporate standing might lower the body’s reputation in the eyes of the public, its 
shareholders and employees. People might therefore be less willing to deal with it, invest in 
it or work there. Decline in revenue or share value might not be actionable as causation is 
difficult to prove without detailed expert testimony or documentary evidence as in Khalid 
Undre v the London Borough of Harrow.39  
 
 
 
                                                          
33 A v B & C plc [2002] EWCA Civ. 337 [11 (vii)] citing dicta of Gleeson CJ in Australian Broadcasting Corp v 
Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 185 ALR 1 [42]: “There is no bright line which can be drawn about what is 
private and what is not…Certain types of information about a person such as information relating to health, 
personal relationships, or finances may be easy to identify as private; as may certain kinds of activity which a 
reasonable person, applying contemporary standards of morals and behaviour, would understand to be meant 
to be unobserved. The requirement that disclosure or observation of information or conduct would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities is in many circumstances a useful practical test of 
what is private.” 
34 Avram v Moldova [2011] ECHR 1076, [36]; Von Hannover No 1 [2004] ECHR 294, [50]; Bogomolova v Russia 
[2017] ECHR 571; Reynolds v Times Newspapers [1999] UKHL 45, 54 (Lord Nicholls); Mosley [7]. 
35 Stjerna v Finland [1994] ECHR 43, [38]. 
36 Privacy cases such as Campbell [2004] UKHL 22; Mosley [2008] EWHC 17777 (QB) and Khuja [2017] UKSC 49 
(who lost as the majority held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy) and defamation cases such 
as Reynolds [1999] UKHL 45; Thomas Bennett Horizontality’s New Horizons – Re-examining Horizontal Effect, 
Privacy, Defamation and the Human Rights Act: Parts 1 and 2 (2010) 21(3) Ent LR 96; (2010) 21(4) Ent L R 145. 
37Steel and Morris v UK [2005] ECHR 103; Jameel v Wall Street Journal [2006] UKHL 44; Magyar 
Tartalomszolgaltatok Egyesulete and Index Hu ZRT v Hungary [2016] ECHR 135; Collins Stewart v The Financial 
Times Ltd [2004] EWHC 2337 (QB) where Tugendhat J struck out a claim based on a fall in share price because 
it was not an appropriate measure of loss; The Bussey Law Firm v Page [2015] EWHC 563 (QB) [14]. 
38 The 2013 Act s 1(2). 
39 [2016] EWHC 931(QB), where Tugendhat J found that: (1) serious financial loss had not been proved (2) 
customers had probably turned away from a struggling business and (3) there was no causal link between any 
financial impact on the business and the allegedly defamatory publication.  
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Misuse of Private Information and ECHR Article 8 and Legal Persons 
Cases on ECHR Art 8 and corporations and the misuse of private information are more 
nuanced. For instance, in Niemietz v Germany40 the Strasbourg Court held that respect for 
private life might include protecting the sanctity of business premises.41 The Court held that: 
“…to interpret the words “private life” and “home” as including certain professional or 
business premises would be consonant with the essential object and purpose of Article 8…, 
namely to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by public authorities”.42 
 
This principle has been applied in the context of competition law proceedings. In Societe 
Colas Est v France,43 the body under investigation had been obliged to comply with 
information requests from the French authorities, the Strasbourg Court held that the 
company’s ECHR Art 8 rights had been infringed and that the limitation in Art 8 in 
subparagraph (2) should be narrowly construed. The infringement was therefore 
disproportionate.44 
 
In Firma EDV v Germany45 the Court balanced ECHR Arts 8 and 10 holding that protecting a 
company’s reputation might be a legitimate aim of ECHR Art 10(2). It specifically left open 
the question of whether a company has a right to reputation for the purposes of ECHR Art 
8(1) but proceeded on the basis that it did.46 ECHR Art 8 does therefore apply to companies 
at least by implication.47 Claiming that companies have a right to reputation is controversial 
as it is difficult to say that companies have the same rights to identity and integrity as natural 
persons.48 Could or should the concept of privacy be said to apply to humans alone?49 The 
Court should have answered this important question more directly. 
                                                          
40[1992] ECHR 80. 
41 The German authorities had a warrant to search its business premises in criminal proceedings and so the 
cases are not factually similar. 
42 Niemietz [31], Lindstrand Partners Advokatbyra AB v Sweden [2016] ECHR 1139, [83] where the Court held 
that the concept of “home” would include a company’s registered office where that company was run by a 
private individual and the registered office of a legal person, plus any branches or other business premises. 
43App no 37971/97 (ECHR 16 April 2002) [47], [49]. Article 8 does mention the right to have correspondence 
kept private. 
44 Any interference by a public authority with an Article 8 right must be prescribed by law and necessary in a 
democratic society. 
45 App no 32782/08 (ECHR 2 September 2014). 
46 [23]. Eileen Weinert however argues in Firma EDV v Germany – do companies have feelings too? (2015) 
26(2) Ent LR 50 that whilst companies have a right to protect the sanctity of their offices and to keep 
correspondence confidential, privacy is a uniquely human concept agreeing with Lord Justice Mustill in Regina 
v Broadcasting Standards Commission ex parte British Broadcasting Corporation [2000] EWCA Civ. 116. She 
interprets Firma EDV as leaving open the question of whether legal persons have rights under the privacy limb 
of ECHR Article 8. 
47 See also Aerztekammer fuer Wien and Dorner v Austria (2016) ECHR 179 where harm to the reputation of a 
company seems to be assumed at [62] and [69]; Heinisch v Germany [2011] ECHR 1175; Steel and Morris 
[2005] ECHR 103, [94] in relation to ECHR Art. 10: “The State therefore enjoys a margin of appreciation as to 
the means it provides under domestic law to enable a company to challenge the truth, and limit the damage, 
of allegations which risk harming its reputation.”   
48 Case Law, Strasbourg: Firma EDV fuer Sie v Germany. Article 8, Companies and the right to Reputation 
<https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/10/09/case-law-strasbourg-firma-edv-fur-sie-v-germany-article-8-
companies-and-the-right-to-reputation-hugh-tomlinson-qc/> 
49 Weinert, above n 46. 
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The approach of the Court of Justice in Luxembourg50 has to some extent drawn on 
Strasbourg case law to ascertain whether ECHR Art 8 can apply to companies. This has 
also proved contentious. 
Comparison with Luxembourg and English Jurisprudence 
Both actions are seemingly outside the scope of EU Law but the case law does contain 
some useful analysis on ECHR Art 8 and its application to corporations. The Luxembourg 
Court considered the issue in cases such as Hoechst v Commission51 which involved 
competition proceedings.52 Advocate General Mischco found no agreement between the 
then EU Member States on whether the concept of the sanctity of the home extended to 
business premises in their domestic law. The Court was clearly influenced by this and 
concluded that the principle of the inviolability of the home did not therefore extend to 
business premises. More recently however, in cases such as Deutsche Bahn AG v The 
Commission53,  the Luxembourg Court acknowledged that ECHR Art 8 might cover business 
premises.54 
This controversial issue has also been analysed in the UK in the BBC case55 where the 
Court of Appeal decided that both individuals and corporate bodies could argue an 
infringement of privacy in a judicial review application in relation to ss 110 and 11 of the 
Broadcasting 1996 (UK) c 55.56 As Lord Woolf MR put it: “There is no dispute that a 
company can make a complaint”57 about the “unjust or unfair treatment or unwarranted 
infringement of privacy”.58 The Act extended to the unwarranted interference in the private 
affairs of a company. Lord Woolf argued that even though intrusion into the private lives of 
individuals might be more objectionable, companies still needed protection from unwarranted 
intrusions into confidential affairs.  
Lady Hale agreed in principle but felt it was hard to find synonyms for “privacy” although 
“avoidance of publicity” (and presumably unwanted publicity) might apply to companies. This 
is a subtle distinction. Companies might wish to keep certain property, meetings and 
correspondence private and to avoid publicity legitimately or illegitimately.59 Lord Mustill 
however took a different view and felt that privacy, could not apply to a corporation: “which 
has no sensitivities to wound and no selfhood to protect”.60 A company might be able to 
                                                          
50 Later the Luxembourg Court. 
51 (46/87 and 227/88) [1989] ECR 2859. In Secretary of State for the Home Department v Watson (C-698/15) 
judgment of 21 December 2016, the Luxembourg Court ruled that it was a breach of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU for domestic law to allow for the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic 
and location data relating to electronic communications for all subscribers and registered users even in the 
fight against crime and terrorism in a different context. 
52 Regulation (EEC) 17/62 of the Council [1959] – [1962] OJ L 13 / 87 (the first Regulation Implementing Articles 
85 and 86 of the European Economic Community Treaty), Art 14(3) now Regulation 1/2003 (EC) of the Council 
[2003] OJ L 1/1. 
53C-583/13P (COJ 18 June 2015). 
54 [20]; Roquette Freres v Commission (C-94/00) (COJ 22 October 2002) [29]. 
55 2000] EWCA Civ. 116. 
56 Programme makers had filmed secretly purchases in Dixons’ stores as part of an investigation into the selling 
of second-hand goods as new.  
57 [29]. 
58 [30]. 
59 [42].  
60 [48]. 
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protect confidential information which was different to: “the essentially human and personal 
concept of privacy”.61 Companies would need to show that they had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in business secrets or price-sensitive information.  
The difference in emphasis and approach between the judges in all three jurisdictions is 
evidence of the controversial nature of the proposition. Companies can rely on ECHR Art 8 
to prevent unwarranted intrusions particularly when asked to reveal sensitive information or 
give access to business premises. However as legal persons do not have the same 
sensibilities as natural persons; this difference cannot be ignored in interpreting ECHR Art 
8(1). Companies can protect information such as trade secrets in an action for breach of 
confidence62 and cases such as Axel Springer63 would support a broad interpretation of 
“reputation” for ECHR Art 8 purposes. 
The scope of ECHR Art 10 to both natural persons and corporate bodies will be considered 
very briefly as it is uncontroversial. 
Case Law on the application of ECHR Article 10 to Corporations 
Media defendants tend to argue Art 10 and freedom of expression when sued for defamation 
or for misuse of private information: 
“Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, 
one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment.”64 
 
ECHR Art 10 encompasses the right to hold opinions, to receive and share them without 
interference from a public authority. Even though the media is given a wide degree of 
latitude, they do have both responsibilities and obligations and should not exceed certain 
boundaries.65 The right to freedom of expression is not absolute. The individual’s right to 
“self-fulfilment” needs to be balanced against the rights of the other party, including the right 
not to be defamed or to be protected against the misuse of private information. ECHR Art 
10(2) contains limitations on the right to freedom of expression including: “the protection of 
the reputation or rights of others.” In Lingens v Austria,66 the applicant had described the 
Austrian Chancellor as a Nazi sympathiser. He argued that his conviction for criminal 
defamation breached ECHR Art 10(2) and the Strasbourg Court agreed, holding that political 
criticism is an important function of the media.67 
The press plays the role of a public watchdog in cases such as Axel Springer particularly 
where criminal proceedings involved 68 as they are more likely to have the requisite element 
of public interest. It is also clear from Autotronic AG v Switzerland, 69 that claimants can rely 
                                                          
61 [49]. 
62 Vestergaard Frandsen A/P v Bestnet Europe [2013] UKSC 31. 
63 [2012] ECHR 227. 
64 Lingens v. Austria [1986] ECHR 7[41]; Sener v. Turkey [2000] ECHR 377; Thoma v. Luxembourg [2001] ECHR 
295; Maronek v. Slovakia [2002] ECHR 154; Dichand v. Austria [2002 ECHR 154 
65ECHR Article 10(2). 
66 Lingens v Austria [1986] ECHR 7. 
67 Lingens [1986] ECHR 7, [42]. See Bowman v United Kingdom (1998) 26 EHRR 1; [1998] ECHR 4, where the 
Strasbourg Court held that free elections, freedom of expression and free political debate were the essence of 
democracy. See also Aquilina v Malta [2011] ECHR 928, [43]. 
68 [2012] ECHR 227, [57]. 
69 [1990] ECHR 12, [47]. 
9 
 
on ECHR Art 10 regardless of whether they are a natural, legal person or a commercial 
entity. 
ECHR Arts 8 (in some contexts) and 10 therefore apply to corporations. This leads us to 
consider the balancing exercise between ECHR Arts 8 and 10 which is central to most cases 
and is essential in analysing whether the issue is in the public interest and whether the 
material should therefore be published. 
 
The ECHR Article 8 / 10 Balance 
 
The Strasbourg Court starts from the premise that freedom of expression is one of the 
essential foundations of any democracy subject to the limitations in ECHR Art 10(2) which 
are to be construed narrowly. Cases such as Lingens70 show that the need for any such 
restriction must be established by the signatory state. 
 
The word “necessary” in ECHR Art 10(2) implies the existence of a “pressing social need”. 
However, the signatory states have a “margin of appreciation” in judging whether the 
restriction can be justified. The Court gives the final ruling on whether any national restriction 
complies with ECHR Art 10.71 It must consider whether any restriction on freedom of 
expression is proportionate, is the reasoning given by the national authorities sufficient and 
do any national standards comply with those set by Strasbourg case law?72This approach 
applies to both actions. 
 
The Court in Axel Springer AG v Germany73  laid down criteria for judging whether the 
national authorities have struck the correct balance between ECHR Arts 10 and 8. Both have 
equal weight74. In Axel Springer75, it found that an allegation of criminal activity contributed to 
a debate on a matter of general interest: the arrest and conviction of an actor for serious 
drugs offences. The Court distinguished between a private figure protecting their private life 
and a public figure. The applicant was a well-known actor and therefore a public figure. He 
had given press interviews and had courted publicity curtailing any expectation of privacy. 
The allegations were also true. It therefore found that preventing publication would infringe 
ECHR Art 10. 
 
In Von Hannover No 276, the Court found that press coverage of the illness of the late Prince 
Rainier III and the conduct of his family (how they reconciled their family obligations with 
their vacation plans) during his illness contributed to a debate on a matter of general interest. 
There was no evidence that the press photos had been taken surreptitiously or unlawfully. 
There was therefore no breach of ECHR Art 8 as there was no reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 
  
These Strasbourg cases broaden the concept of a “public figure” covering anyone well- 
known to the public or regarded as a celebrity. The protection afforded to them is lower than 
for relatively unknown individuals as it is harder to establish that public figures have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. It might seem harsh on Princess Caroline as she had 
succeeded elsewhere in persuading the Court that there was no public interest in knowing 
                                                          
70  [1986] ECHR 7 
71 Amarson v Iceland [2017] ECHR 530. 
72 Janowski v Poland [1999] ECHR 3. 
73 [2012] ECHR 227, [89] – [95] heard on the same day as Von Hannover No 2 v Germany [2012] ECHR 228.  
74 Faludy-Kovacs v Hungary judgment of 23rd January 2018, where the Strasbourg Court also held at [29] that it 
would be loath to interfere with the national court’s assessment of the Art 8 /10 balance where its case law 
had been followed. 
75 [2012] ECHR 227. 
76 [2012] ECHR 228. 
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her whereabouts and how she behaved in her private life even in public places.77 These two 
Von Hannover cases are however distinguishable on their facts because there was more of 
a link between the story and her official role in Von Hannover No 2.78 The Court veers 
towards freedom of expression at the expense of privacy in its broad formulation of the 
concept of a public figure79. 
 
 Subsequent cases apply the criteria in interesting ways. Although both Axel Springer80 and 
Von Hannover No 281 are privacy cases where the criteria seem to work quite well, the 
principles derived from those cases have been applied to defamation cases regardless of 
whether the domestic action arose in civil or criminal defamation proceedings.82 This 
development draws the two causes of action closer together than almost any other. It also 
begs the question as to whether the same criteria should be used for both. As Hugh 
Tomlinson Q.C. has argued,83 the Strasbourg Court no longer focusses on the truth of the 
material and whether it has been verified in defamation cases.84 The Axel Springer criteria85 
leave little room for a consideration of truth even though it is a defence to an English 
defamation action86 as is publication on an issue of public interest.87 How that information 
was obtained and whether the claimant had already put similar information into the public 
domain would be irrelevant in English defamation proceedings but not in an action for 
misuse of private information. Mr Tomlinson is right when he concludes that although it is not 
easy to distinguish between the two actions, the Court ought to have taken more care in 
applying the same criteria to both types of action. 
 
For instance, in Print Zeitungsverlag GmbH v Austria,88 it failed to acknowledge that it was 
applying the Axel Springer criteria89 to a defamation case. Nor did it refer to the fact that 
Austrian law provided for criminal sanctions although it did consider whether the material 
was true.  Both Axel Springer90 and Von Hannover No 2 involved celebrities claiming that 
their privacy had been infringed and Print Zeitungsverlag91 involved the defamation of two 
politicians where the media are afforded more latitude.92 The Court never explained why the 
                                                          
77 Von Hannover v Germany [2004] ECHR 294; 5 RB, Axel Springer v Germany <http://www.5rb.com/case/axel-
springer-eg-v-germany/>; One Brick Court, Axel Springer v Germany” 
<http:www.onebrickcourt.co/cases.aspx?menu=main&pageid=42&caseid=460>; Von Hannover No.1 [2004] 
ECHR 294; Princess Caroline’s brother lost in Strasbourg in Couderc v France [2011] ECHR 66 where the Court 
ruled that the public had a right to know about his illegitimate child conceived before he married. 
78 [2012] ECHR 228. 
79 But see Standard Verlags GmbH v Austria [2009] ECHR 853 [52] where the court felt that “idle gossip” about 
the state of a politician’s marriage and alleged extra - marital relationships was not a matter of public interest. 
80 [2012] ECHR 227. 
81 [2012] ECHR 228. 
82 Ristamaki and Korvola v Finland [2013] ECHR 1052; Caragea v Romania [2015 ECHR 1069 are cases where 
the Axel Springer criteria ([2012] ECHR 227) were applied to criminal defamation proceedings; Ungvary and 
Irodalom Kft v Hungary [2013] ECHR 1229; Print Zeitungsverlag [2013] ECHR 943. 
83 <https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/01/23/privacy-and-defamation-strasbourg-blurs-the-boundaries-
hugh-tomlinson-qc/>. 
84 White [2006] ECHR 793. 
85 [2012] ECHR 227. 
86 The defence is codified in the 2013 Act s 2. Tugendhat and Christie, above n 2, argue at 360 that truth is the 
main way in which English private law protects freedom of expression. 
87 The 2013 Act s 4. 
88 [2013] ECHR 943. 
89 [2012] ECHR 227. 
90 [2012] ECHR 227 
91 [2013] ECHR 943 
92 Lingens [1986] ECHR 7. 
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Axel Springer criteria93 should be applied to a defamation case when holding that there was 
no breach of ECHR Art10. 
 
Indeed, as Mr Tomlinson has pointed out,94 the Axel Springer criteria95 are very different to 
those traditionally used by the Strasbourg Court in defamation cases. It has tended to focus 
more on whether the journalist had acted responsibly.96 It is arguable therefore, as Mr 
Tomlinson contends, that the conclusion in Print Zeitungsverlag97 would have been different 
had the traditional criteria been applied. The letter in that case did not make any serious 
factual allegations and the context was political discussion. The allegations were reported 
rather than adopted which might have fallen within the English defence of reportage.98 
 
Ungvary99 is a civil defamation case where a judgment against a historian and a literary 
weekly breached ECHR Art 10. The story involved statements alleging that a judge in the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court had been involved in communist activities. The Strasbourg 
Court relied on the Axel Springer criteria100 focussing on the fact that the judge was a public 
figure and should therefore be subject to greater public scrutiny.  Seeking out historical truth 
was an integral part of freedom of expression not considered by the Hungarian Court. The 
Strasbourg Court found that level of damages and legal costs awarded limited the historian’s 
freedom of expression. The national court had not struck the correct balance between ECHR 
Arts 8 and 10. This case can be contrasted with the earlier case of Prager and Oberschlick v 
Austria101 also dealing with the defamation of a judge. Here the Court found no violation of 
ECHR Art 10. The author in Ungvary102 was considered a respectable author, a historian 
using specialist knowledge to interpret archives published in a literary journal. The dissenting 
judge in Ungvary103 felt that it was a borderline case. Distinctions are fine here and 
precedent is weak which undesirable for legal certainty. 
The Strasbourg case law is not consistent. After Axel Springer104, the Court decides first, that 
the same approach should be taken on the question of public interest and second, that a 
liberal interpretation of who is a public figure warranting closer scrutiny. The Axel Springer 
criteria105 were designed to be applied to cases about private life rather than reputation 
where they worked reasonably well. The Court takes no account of whether the cases arise 
from civil or criminal defamation proceedings. Powerful criticisms are made in the joint 
                                                          
93 [2012] ECHR 227. 
94 Hugh Tomlinson QC and Sara Mansoori, Libel and Privacy: How are the Courts approaching privacy in recent 
cases, including the confluence of Libel and Privacy and how does this impact on advice to clients 
<www.whitepaperdocuments.co.uk/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=2496>.  
95 [2012] ECHR 227. 
96 Roberts v United Kingdom App no (ECHR 5 July 2011) [45]; [2010] ECHR 1341 Polanco Torres & Movilla 
Polanco v Spain which influenced Lord Nichols in drafting his criteria in Reynolds [1999] UKHL 45, 57. 
97 [2013] ECHR 943. 
98 Reportage is a sub-species of qualified privilege which now appears in the 2013 Act s 4(3) although it does 
not codify the common law. Detailed consideration is beyond the scope of the article but is analysed in Sarah 
Gale Qualified Privilege in Defamation and the Evolution of the Doctrine of Reportage (2015) 23 TLR 16. 
99 [2013] ECHR 1229. 
100 [2012] ECHR 227. 
101[1995] ECHR 12. 
102 [2013] ECHR 1229. 
103 [2013] ECHR 1229. 
104 [2012] ECHR 227. 
105 [2012] ECHR 227. 
12 
 
dissenting opinion in Fuerst-Pfeifer v Austria 106 attacking the Court’s approach accusing it of 
amongst other things inconsistency and of favouring Art 10 over Art 8. The applicant’s Art 8 
rights should have prevailed because the revelations concerned her mental health.  
Publication did not contribute to an ongoing public discussion about the integrity of the 
applicant as the story had initiated that debate.The article had not contributed to a serious 
public debate on a matter of general public interest. Judge Motoc was more measured in her 
dissent concluding that Art 8 should apply where there is a serious and direct attack on 
personal integrity where private medical records are revealed. This must be correct. 
We will focus next on remedies. The approach taken by the English courts on exemplary 
damages for both actions was different historically. There is still however a distinction when 
it comes to interim injunctions. 
Damages 
The aim of damages is obviously redress although there are fundamental theoretical 
differences between the two actions here. Defamation actions are aimed at compensation 
for harm to reputation whereas actions for the misuse of private information provide 
compensation for distress or injury to feelings and loss of dignity107. In Gulati,108 it was held 
that damages should also reflect the claimant’s loss of control over the use of private 
information. Both actions are about the infringement of ECHR Art 8 although the emphasis in 
privacy actions is rather different as Eady J pointed out in Mosley109: damages are about 
vindicating the infringement of a right not about the vindication of reputation.110 Whilst 
damages can to some extent repair injury to reputation, once private information is public, 
then no amount of compensation is sufficient.111 Eady J argued in Mosley112 that if your 
dignity is taken away, that goes to the core of your personality.113 Could the same be said of 
a defamation action? If both actions are about loss of personal dignity, autonomy and 
dignity, then the rules on damages should be similar. Levels of compensation were modest 
in privacy cases when compared to defamation cases until Mosley114. The higher awards in 
Gulati115 might not be repeated. 
The principle that juries and presumably now judges116 in defamation cases should refer to 
levels of general damages awarded in personal injury cases was clear from Elton John v 
Mirror Group Newspapers Limited117 even though there was no precise correlation between 
                                                          
106 Judgment of 17 May 2016. 
107 Cooper v Turrell [2011] EWHC 3629 (QB), [102] (Tugendhat J): “Damages for defamation are a remedy to 
vindicate a claimant’s reputation for the damage done by the publication of false statements. Damages for 
misuse of private information are to compensate for the damage, and injury to feelings and distress, caused by 
the publication of information which may be either true or false.” 
108 [2015] EWCA Civ. 1291. 
109 [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB). 
110[2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [216]. 
111 Mosley [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [231]. 
112 [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB). 
113 [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [216]. 
114 [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB). 
115 [2015] EWCA Civ. 1291. 
116 The 2013 Act s. 11 was interpreted narrowly in Yeo v Times Newspapers [2014] EWHC 2853 (QB) to exclude 
jury trial in most cases. 
117 [1995] EWCA Civ. 23. This controversial principle was not followed in Gleaner v Abrahams [2002] UKPC 55 
[63]. 
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damage to reputation and personal injury. Eady J suggests118 that the same principle should 
apply to privacy cases.  
Exemplary damages119 were seen as punishing defendants for outrageous, deliberate or 
reckless disregard of the claimant’s rights, but not available misuse of private information 
actions. In Mosley,120 Eady J argues that exemplary damages should not be used in privacy 
cases. Lord Mance in PJS121 (with whom the majority agreed) did not however rule out that 
possibility. Lord Toulson (dissenting) said that exemplary damages in actions for misuse of 
private information were necessary to: “deter flagrant breaches of privacy and to provide 
adequate protection”.122 Presumably he had in mind the possibility that very high awards of 
damages might breach ECHR Art 10123 but proportionate exemplary damages would not.124 
The Crime and Courts Act 2013 (UK) c 22 ss 34 - 42 (which came into force on 3rd 
November 2015, a year after the establishment of the Press Recognition Panel125) might 
have changed things by introducing a self-regulatory scheme for claims against the press.126 
It applies to both actions127. Although Lord Justice Leveson did not hear evidence on 
exemplary damages, he recommended that membership of a regulatory body be regarded 
as complying with industry standards. However, IMPRESS, the Independent Monitor for the 
Press, was the first regulator to be recognised by the PRP128 but most regional and national 
press have opted to join the Independent Press Standards Organisation instead which has 
not applied for recognition and is therefore not covered by the CCA. The scope of the CCA 
seems therefore likely to be limited. Section 34(2) provides that exemplary damages cannot 
normally be awarded against members.129 Failure to sign up could be viewed by the judge 
an excuse for awarding exemplary damages as could lack of or inadequate internal 
governance130 on the sourcing of stories.131 Exemplary damages will not be awarded 
                                                          
118 Mosley [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [218]. 
119See Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 where the court held that they are intended primarily to punish and 
deter defendants; Cassell v Broome [1972] AC 1027; Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicester [2002] 2 AC 122 and 
Elton John [1995] EWCA Civ. 23, where the Court suggested that the claimant had to show that the defendant 
either knew or was reckless as to whether the material was false, or had published it after calculating that the 
potential profit outweighed any possible penalty. 
120[2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [172] - [173]; [197]. 
121 PJS v Newsgroup Newspapers [2016] UKSC 26, [42]. 
122[92]. 
123Tolstoy Miloslawsky v UK [1995] ECHR 25. 
124 Normann Witzleb, Exemplary Damages for Invasions of Privacy (2014) 6(1) Journal of Media Law 69, 83. 
125 Later PRP. 
126 Broadcasters are dealt with by other regulators such as OFCOM or the BBC Trust – Schedule 15. The 
defendants or “relevant publishers” (s. 41) would include most major newspapers and magazine publishers. 
127 Sections 42(4)(a) & (d). 
128 On 25th October 2016. 
129 Section 34(3) provides that s34(2) will not apply where the regulator had already imposed a fine on the 
defendant or decided not to do so, where the regulator’s conduct was “manifestly irrational” or the court is 
satisfied that it would otherwise have made an award of exemplary damages. Section 34(6) states that 
exemplary damages can only be awarded where the defendant’s conduct shows a “deliberate or reckless 
disregard of an outrageous nature” or if it is necessary to punish him.  
130 Section 35(3)(3)(a) and (4). 
131 Leveson Report into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press Volume IV paragraphs 511 and 512 pages 
1511 - 1512 <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/attachment.../0780_ivpdf>.  
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automatically132 as the judge must consider all the circumstances of the case and how the 
defendant’s conduct is viewed. The Government plans to repeal s 40 which provides that the 
defendant would have to pay the claimant’s costs even if it wins, unless it is registered.133 
We will conclude this section on remedies by looking at interlocutory injunctions. 
Injunctions 
Interim injunctions are arguably the most important tool for protecting the claimant’s ECHR 
Art 8 rights but the HRA s 12 provides that freedom of expression must be considered in any 
application for prior restraint. Once the information is public, the harm has been done and 
damages seem a rather inadequate remedy.134 Unfortunately, the courts take a rather 
different view depending on how the action is framed. In Bonnard v Perryman135, the court 
was reluctant to grant an interim injunction in libel proceedings unless it could be shown that 
the claim was bound to succeed and only a perverse jury (presumably now the judge) would 
reject it,136 or if the apparently defamatory material is untrue.137 That conclusion would be 
hard to draw at an interim stage without full disclosure and detailed consideration of the 
evidence and examination of the witnesses.138 This is important where truth is argued.139 
References to the constitutional importance of jury trial as a reason for this rule cannot be 
argued now as jury trial is no longer the norm140 although the argument that there is a public 
interest in the truth coming out is more persuasive.141 In Greene,142 the Court of Appeal said 
that the ruling in Bonnard had survived the 1998 Act s. 12(3). To rule otherwise would be a 
significant restriction on freedom of speech.143 In Cream Holdings Limited v Banerjee,144 
Lord Nicholls held that the main purpose of s.12(3): 
                                                          
132 Hugh Tomlinson QC “The Leveson Report and Exemplary Damages: No “Violation of Free Speech” 
<http://hackinginquiry.or/comment/the-leveson-reoprt-and-exemplary-damages-no-violation-of-free-speech> 
where Mr Tomlinson explains how the Act might breach ECHR Article 14 at page 7, see also Witzleb, above n 
121, 88. 
133https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f
ile/684678/GOVERNMENT_RESPONSE_TO_THE_CONSULTATION_ON_THE_LEVESON_INQUIRY_AND
_ITS_IMPLEMENTATION_.pdf   
134 Mosley [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB).  
135 [1891] 2 Ch 269. 
136 Courts will not grant an interim injunction if the defendant can show that he intends to plead justification 
(now truth, 2013 Act s.2) as in Bonnard [1891 2 Ch 269, honest opinion (2013 Act s 3) as in Fraser v Evans 
[1969] QB 349 or common law privilege (Harakas v Baltic Mercantile & Shipping Exchange Ltd) [1982] 1 WLR 
958 or if the court believes that the defence will not succeed. This favours freedom of expression. Defences 
are considered in the penultimate section of this piece. 
137 Holley v Smyth [1997] EWCA Civ. 2914, 2932 (Slade LJ).  
138 The credibility of witnesses is key to determining justification. 
139 Greene v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ. 1462 [30], [77], where the defence of justification 
was pleaded. 
140 The 2013 Act s.11. 
141 Fraser [1969] 1 QB 349. 
142 [2003] EWCA Civ. 103, (a case on the protection of confidential information)  
143 The 1998 Act s.12(1); Observer and the Guardian v UK App No. 13585/88 (ECHR 26 November 1991) [60]: 
“…the dangers inherent in prior restraints are such that they call for the most careful scrutiny on the part of 
the Court. This is especially so as far as the press are concerned, for news is a perishable commodity and to 
delay its publication, even for a short period, may well deprive it of all its value and interest.”  
144 [2004] UKSC 44, [15]. 
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“Was to buttress the protection afforded to freedom of speech at the interlocutory stage. It 
sought to do so by setting a higher threshold for the grant of interlocutory injunctions…”   
Judges should consider whether the case should have been pleaded in defamation and then 
apply the more restrictive test for defamation cases to avoid abuse of process allegations.145 
However, in RST v UVW146, Tugendhat J granted the injunction on the basis that it was a 
privacy case. He faced the same dilemma in Terry where he said that the court’s first 
concern is whether ECHR Art 10 prevails over Art 8. The claimant’s choice of cause of 
action is not therefore the sole consideration.147 He decided that it was a defamation case 
and therefore applied the rule in Bonnard.148 Judges are sensitive to this and will not allow 
the rules to be abused to avoid the ruling in Bonnard.149 However, the outcome of these 
cases is still hard to predict and legal certainty is not served well by the current state of the 
law. 
In ZAM v CFW and TFW,150 Tugendhat J granted an interim injunction in libel proceedings 
holding that the material was clearly defamatory and the defence of truth was not available. 
He was influenced by the fact that the Claimant had a case under the Protection from 
Harassment Act (UK), c 40 1997,151 and case law provides that the exercise of free speech 
might fall within the scope of harassment.152 Indeed, cases are emerging that indicate that 
the tort of harassment might provide a way around the strict rule in Bonnard153. The 1997 Act 
does not however mention either ECHR Art 10 or defamation154 but in Merlin v Cave, Laing J 
held that the 1998 Act s. 12(3) should nevertheless apply in harassment cases.155 In Brand v 
Berki 156 however, Carr J granted an interim injunction under the 1997 Act even though 
defamation had been pleaded in the claim form. It had been argued as a harassment case 
and there was no privacy claim. 
The threshold for misuse of private information actions seems lower than in defamation 
actions. The traditional view is stated in Carter-Ruck:157 the claimant would usually need to 
prove on the balance of probabilities that he would win at trial. However, he might succeed 
exceptionally where: “the potential adverse consequences of publication could be particularly 
grave, or where a short-lived injunction allows time for the proper consideration of the 
application.” Two recent cases demonstrate this: first, in PJS158, Lord Mance found that 
                                                          
145 Carter-Ruck, n 135, 699. Specialist judges are well-equipped to decide these issues. 
146 [2009] EWHC 2448 (QB) 2448. 
147 [2010] EWHC 110 (QB) [88]. 
148 The claim had been argued as both a breach of confidence and misuse of private information case but the 
judge said that it was about damage to reputation and therefore a defamation claim. 
149 In Browne [2007] EWHC 202 (QB) [30], Eady J pointed out obiter (upholding Buxton LJ in McKennitt [2006] 
EWCA Civ. 1714, [79]) that arguing a claim as breach of confidence when it was a series of false allegations to 
avoid the rule in Bonnard [1891] 2 Ch 269 might be an abuse of process. 
150 [2011] EWHC 476 (QB). 
151 The 1997 Act. 
152 Howlett v Holding [2006] EWHC 41 [4]. 
153 [1891] 2 Ch 269. 
154 Jennifer Agate, From Defamation to Harassment – Merlin, Brand and circumventing Bonnard (2015) 26(1) 
Ent LR 29. 
155 [2014] EWHC 3036 QB [43] – [48]. No interim injunction was granted.  
156 [2014] EWHC 2979 (QB). 
157 Cameron Doley and Alistair Mullis, Carter-Ruck on Libel and Privacy (Lexis Nexis, 6th ed, 2009), 268. 
158 [2016] UKSC 26. 
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exemplary damages would be inadequate159 and that an injunction limiting publication 
should be granted. The interest in the story and in those involved plus details of their sexual 
activities would cause terrible distress to them and to their children. Second, in Weller v 
Associated Newspapers Ltd,160 the Court of Appeal felt that an injunction should be granted 
where further publication was feared. Although the defendant did not intend to republish the 
photos, it refused to undertake not to do so. Both cases involved potential harm to children 
where the court leans towards ECHR Art 8. 
Traditionally the threshold for the granting of interim injunctions is much higher in defamation 
than in privacy cases even though they are both based around ECHR Art 8. Privacy is lost 
forever after publication apparently whereas harm to reputation can be vindicated at trial.161 
Surely no amount of damages can repair damage to reputation especially if the trial attracts 
a lot of media interest. 
The rule in Bonnard162 is however being eroded by claimants framing their cases under the 
1997 Act. A “pure” defamation case would still be caught by Bonnard. That is seen in 
Terry163 and McKennitt164 where the judge suggested that it might be an abuse of process to 
argue privacy unless the 1997 Act is pleaded instead.  
Busutill and McCafferty165 argue that this puts a heavy premium on specialist advice and 
costly expert drafting creating uncertainty which is not in the interests of justice because the 
result depends on whether the judge will take the claim at face value and grant the injunction 
or conclude that the claimant is manipulating the system and refuse it.166 
We will now move onto defences where there is more of a dividing line between the two. 
Defences 
Some of the main defences will be considered and compared. There are several special 
defences in defamation such as innocent dissemination,167 honest opinion,168  publication on 
a matter of public interest,169 peer-reviewed statements in scientific or academic journals,170 
qualified privilege at common law171  and under the 2013 Act172 and truth.173 
The dividing line between the two actions can turn on whether the material is true as truth is 
not a defence in misuse of private information actions whereas material is presumed to be 
                                                          
159 [42] - [43]. 
160 [2015] EWCA Civ. 1176. 
161 Carter-Ruck, above n 154, 698. 
162 [1891] 2 Ch 269. 
163 [2010] EWHC 11 (QB,) [149].  
164 [ 2006] EWCA Civ. 1714, [79]. 
165 Interim Injunctions and the Overlap between Privacy and Libel Part 2 <https://inforrm.wordpress.com>. 
166 For further criticism see Carter-Ruck, above n 154, 701. 
167 Defamation Act 1996 (UK) c 31, s 1. 
168 The 2013 Act 2013 s 3. 
169 The 2013 Act s 4; Gale, n 97.  
170 The 2013 Act s 6. 
171 Clift v Slough Borough Council [2010] EWCA Civ. 1484. 
172 The 2013 Acts ss 7(2) – (10). 
173 The 2013 Act s 2. 
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untrue in defamation cases unless the defence proves otherwise.174 It should be an abuse of 
process to plead misuse of private information to avoid losing defamation proceedings 
because the material is true.175 Malice defeats defences such as qualified privilege at 
common law.176 There is no equivalent for misuse of private information. 
How the balance is struck between ECHR Arts 8 and 10 is at the heart of both actions as is 
the issue of public interest e.g. in Campbell177, Naomi Campbell, had denied taking drugs 
and so there was a public interest in correcting that false impression and Art 10 prevailed. 
Even if the claimant did have a reasonable expectation of privacy, the defendant’s right to 
publish and the public’s right to receive that information outweighed the claimant’s right to 
privacy.178 Does the publication contribute to a debate on a matter of public interest?179 This 
is not a defence to the action for misuse of private information but should be a factor which 
precludes the existence of the cause of action. 
Public interest is a defence to defamation in 2013 Act s 4. Judges have discretion in deciding 
whether the threshold has been met although the starting point for both actions is a different 
one. In privacy cases, the court decides whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy 
and in defamation cases, the judge decides whether the claimant has satisfied the court that 
all the necessary elements have been proved180 and the issue of public interest is a defence. 
As we have seen, public figures and especially politicians in privacy cases can expect far 
greater scrutiny from the media as political debate is the lifeblood of a democracy.181 The 
public interest “threshold” is arguably lower here. The same cannot necessarily be said for 
defamation cases although public figures are more likely to sue to protect their reputation. A 
similar interpretation of public interest could apply to both if it is sufficiently flexible. 
There are few cases on the 2013 Act s 4 and so it remains to be seen how the Reynolds 
criteria182 will still be considered under s 4(2). Warby J in Yeo v Times183 held that 
Reynolds184 covered all matters of clear public interest and that the Reynolds’ approach 
would still apply despite s 4(6). The law should take a more flexible approach to the criteria 
as they were not codified in s 4. 
That view is supported by Warby J in Economou v de Freitas185 in relation to whether the 
defendant: “reasonably believed that publishing the statement complained of was in the public 
interest” in s 4(1)(b) (a novel feature of the Act). Warby J rejected the proposition that this 
referred to the judgment of the defendant from a purely subjective viewpoint.186 The claimant 
                                                          
174 Edwin Peel and James Goudkamp, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (19th edition Sweet and Maxwell, 2014), 
378, analyses defamation defences. 
175 Hannon [2014] EWHC 1580 (Ch), [26]. 
176 Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135. 
177 [2004] UKHL 22. 
178 Carter Ruck, n 154, 1047.  
179 Lady Hale in Jameel [2006] UKHL 44 [147]. 
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181 Lingens [1986] ECHR 7. 
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must prove that he believed that publishing the material was in the public interest and that his 
belief was reasonable. The court should only consider a belief to be reasonable if the 
defendant has carried out the “enquiries and checks” that could be reasonably expected of 
that defendant in those circumstances.187 The court should look at the subject matter of the 
material, the words used and any possible meanings the defendant ought to have envisaged 
that they might convey. The role played by the defendant was also relevant.188 A lay defendant 
who provides material to be used in a broadcast or article should not be judged by the same 
investigative standards expected of a journalist.189 Warby J is advocating a flexible use of the 
Reynolds criteria making the outcome of cases unpredictable. Serafin v Malkiewicz190 makes 
it clear amongst other things that where there are multiple allegations, there is no need to find 
that publication of each one is in the public interest. 
Express or implied consent is a defence to both actions. If the claimant has consented to 
publication, then he cannot be said to have a reasonable expectation of privacy.191 Consent 
is rarely used in defamation cases.192 
The defendant might argue that he was not responsible for the communication or did not 
publish it. That would be a defence in a misuse of private information action and the claim 
would not succeed if the material had not been published by the defendant in defamation 
proceedings. 
There would be no expectation of privacy where the material is not private, is “trivial or 
anodyne” or if the claimant has invited the media into this area of his private life or to another 
linked area.193  The same cannot be said for defamation which turns on whether the 
elements of the tort are made out. Each privacy case will depend on its own facts194 and so 
precedent might be tricky.  
Conclusions 
This author has argued that the relationship between the two actions is still evolving and 
many fundamental issues remain unresolved, in particular whether claimants should be 
allowed to bring parallel proceedings. Arguing the two in the alternative is preferable in 
cases where the dividing line is blurred. The abuse of process argument must prevail, 
preventing parallel actions, otherwise claimants will be allowed to avoid the one-year 
limitation period and the defence of truth in defamation cases by arguing privacy. The choice 
between the two might also be influenced by whether the court is likely to grant an interim 
injunction. Framing a defamation case as a harassment case should not be allowed to 
circumvent the strict rule in Bonnard. It makes little sense not to allow interim injunctions in 
defamation actions but to allow the rule in Bonnard to be circumvented by arguing 
                                                          
187 The Reynolds’ criteria ([1999] UKHL 45) applied to investigative journalism: see Gale, above n 97.  
188 [241]. 
189 [246]. 
190 [2017] EWHC 2992 
191 Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ. 446 [36]. 
192 Winfield, n 171, 406. 
165 McKennitt [2006] EWCA Civ. 1714, [12]; Browne [2007] EWCA Civ. 295 [33], where Sir Anthony Clarke MR 
suggested that even a trivial piece of information could be private although the nature of the relationship in 
which the information had been revealed was likely to be significant; Carter-Ruck, above n 154, 1044; 
Tugendhat and Christie, above n 2, 182. 
194 Browne [2007] EWCA Civ. 295 [31].  
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harassment instead. This argument is even harder to justify in cases such as Brand195 where 
defamation had been pleaded earlier in the proceedings. This “loophole” creates legal 
uncertainty and does not stand up to logical analysis. Genuine defamation cases should be 
argued as defamation cases. The choice between defamation and privacy actions might also 
be influenced by the argument that damage to reputation can be vindicated by an award of 
damages but that the leaking of private information cannot which is unconvincing in the 
author’s opinion. Exemplary damages should be available in both actions. 
As we have seen, the two actions are linked partly because of the ECHR Arts 8 and 10 
balancing exercise and the role played by the concept of public interest albeit slightly 
differently in both actions. The influence of the Strasbourg Court in the development of 
English law should not be underestimated although it tends to take a broader attitude to the 
concepts of what is in the public interest and respect for private life. The Court veers towards 
ECHR Art 10 at the expense Art 8 in its broad formulation of the concept of a public figure 
affording them less protection than unknown individuals. The cogent criticisms of the 
dissenting judges in Fuerst-Pfeifer v Austria196 should not be ignored however. 
 
Strasbourg case law brings the two actions are drawn closer together with the Axel 
Springer197 criteria on the ECHR Art 8 / 10 balance but they are not equipped to deal 
properly with the subtleties of English defamation law. After all, those criteria were designed 
originally to apply to privacy cases. Whilst there is a distinction in principle between the two 
actions as defamation is about protecting reputation and the action for misuse of private 
information focusses more on keeping private certain information and images, they can still 
overlap. Each action should and does retain its distinctive features even though Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is bringing them closer together. 
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